Masih Mungkinkah Semantik?

Jonathan Berg

Diterjemahkan oleh  Jane Frances Ragavan

Abstrak

Pandangan lazim tentang semantik-bahawa setiap ayat yang mem­punyai satu tafsiran mempunyai kandungan semantik yang tertentu, berbanding dengan pemberian kandungan kepada penyataan yang bergantung pada konteks, dan tidak semestinya serupa dengan apa yang mungkin disampaikan (secara pragmatik) oleh pengucapnya ­disokong berbanding dengan bantahan lazim dan juga didukung atas sebab-sebab bebas, yang menyarankan bahawa bantahan kepada pandangan ini berpunca daripada kegagalan membezakan antara “semantik yang sebenarnya” dengan “semantik yang kurang tepat”.

Abstract

The standard view of semantics-that every disambiguated sentence has a determinate semantic content, relative to an assignment of con­tents to its indexical expressions, and not necessarily identical to what may be conveyed (pragmatically) by its utterance-is defended against standard objections and is also argued for on independent grounds, which suggest that resistance to the view comes from a failure to dis­tinguish between “strict semantics “and “loose semantics”.

RUJUKAN

Barwise, Jon dan John Perry, 1983. Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge: MIT Press. Berg, Jonathan, 1998. In Defense of Direct Belief’ Substitutivity, Availability, and Iterability. Lingua e Stile 33: 461-70.

Berg, Jonathan, 1993. Literal Meaning and Context. Iyyun 42:297-411.

Carnap, Rudolph, 1956. Meaning and Necessity, edisi ke-2. Chicago: University  of Chicago Press.  Frege, Gottlob, 1982. Ueber Sinn Un bedeutung Zeitschrift fur Philosophie and Philosipphische Kritik 100:25-50.

Greenfield, P., dan C. Dents, 1979. “A Developmental Study of the Communica­tion of Meaning: The Role of Uncertainty and Information”. dlm.: P.L French. (ed.) The development of meaning, 300-337. Hiroshima: Bunka Hyoron.

Grice, Paul, 1975. “Logic and Conversation”. dlm.: P. Cole dan J. Morgan (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Jit. 3, 41-58, New York: Academic Press (Dicetak semula dalam Grice, Paul, 1989. Studies in The Way of Words. Cambridge:  Harvard University Press).

Kaplan, David, 1989. Afterthoughts. dlm.: J. Almog, J. Perry dan J. Morgan (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Jil. 3. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kripke, Saul, 1977. “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference”. dlm. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2: 255-76. (Dicetak semula dalam: P.A. French, T.E. (ed.), Uehling dan H.K. Wettstein, 1979. Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language 6-27. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Perry, John, 1988. Cognitive Significance and New Theories of Reference. Nous  22: 1-18.

Putnam, Hilary, 1970. “Is Semantics Possible”? dlm.: H. Keifer dan M. Mintz, (ed.), Languages, belief and metaphysics, 139-152. Press Albany: SUNY (Dicetak semula dalam: H. Putnam, 1975. “Mind, language and reality”. Kertas Kerja Falsafah, Jil. 2, 139-52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Putnam, Hilary, 1977. ” … I thought of what I called an ‘automatic sweetheart’.” Syarahan I, Ben-Gurion University.

Quine, W.V.O., 1951. Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review 60:20­43 (Dicetak semula dalam: W.V.O. Quine, 1961. From a logical point of view, edisi ke-2, 20-46 New York: Harper and Row).

RusselI, Bertrand, 1905. On Denoting. Mind 14:479-93.

Searle, John, 1969. Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, John, 1978. Literal Meaning. Erkenntnis 13:207-24.

Strawson, P.E, 1950. On Referring. Mind 59:320-44.

Travis, Charles, 1989. The Uses of Sense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Travis, Charles, 1991. Annals of Analysis. Mind 100:237-64.

Travis, Charles, 1997. “Pragmatics”. dlm.: B. Hale dan C. Wright, (ed.), A companion to the philosophy of language, 87-107. Oxford: Blackwell.

(Teks Penuh)

Hantar Maklum Balas Anda